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INTRODUCTION

Documents released over the past year detailing the National Security
Agency's ("NSA") telephony metadata collection program and interception
of international content under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) implicated U.S. high technology companies in government
surveillance.' The result was an immediate, and detrimental, impact on
U.S. corporations, the economy, and U.S. national security.
The first Snowden documents, printed on June 5, 2013, revealed that the
government had served orders on Verizon, directing the company to turn
over telephony metadata under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.2
The following day, The Guardianpublished classified slides detailing how
the NSA had intercepted international content under Section 702 of the
FISA Amendments Act.3 The type of information obtained ranged from Email, video and voice chat, videos, photos, and stored data, to Voice over
Internet Protocol, file transfers, video conferencing, notifications of target
activity, and online social networking. The companies involved read like
a who's who of U.S. Internet giants: Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook,
PalTalk, YouTube, Skype, AOL, and Apple.5

1. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism ProgramTaps in to
User Data of Apple, Google, and Others, THE GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013, 3:23 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data;
Barton
Gellman and Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S.
Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. PosT (June 7, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nineus-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3aOcOda8-cebf- 11 e2-8845d970ccb04497_story.html?hpid=zl; Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records
of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, THE GUARDIAN, (June 6, 2013, 8:05 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/j un/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order
[herenafter Greenwald, NSA Collected Verizon Records]; Glenn Greenwald, Microsoft
Handed the NSA Access to Encrypted Messages, THE GUARDIAN, (July 12, 2013, 5:04
PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/ll/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-userdata; Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data
Centers Worldwide, Snowden Documents Say, WASH. PosT (Oct. 30, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoogoogle-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-416611 c3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd story.html. For statutory and constitutional analysis of the
telephony metadata program and the interception of international content, see Laura K.
Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 757 (2014) [hereinafter Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection];
Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and
Internet Content, 38 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, (forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter
Donohue, Section 702).
2. Greenwald, NSA Collecting PhoneRecords, supra note 1.
3. Greenwald & MacAskill, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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More articles highlighting the extent to which the NSA had become
embedded in the U.S. high tech industry followed. In September 2013
ProPublica and the New York Times revealed that the NSA had enjoyed
considerable success in cracking commonly used cryptography.
The
following month the Washington Post reported that the NSA, without the
consent of the companies involved, had obtained millions of customers'
address book data. In one day alone, some 444,743 email addresses from
Yahoo, 105,068 from Hotmail, 82,857 from Facebook, 33,697 from Gmail,
and 22,881 from other providers.7
The extent of upstream collection stunned the public, as did slides
demonstrating how the NSA had bypassed the companies' encryption,
intercepting data as it transferred between the public Internet and the
Google cloud.8 Documents further suggested that the NSA had helped to
promote encryption standards for which it already held the key or whose
vulnerabilities the agency understood but had not taken steps to address. 9
Beyond this, press reports indicated that the NSA had at times posed as
U.S. companies-without their knowledge-in order to gain access to
foreign targets. In November 2013 Der Spiegel reported that the NSA and
the United Kingdom's Government Communications Headquarters
("GCHQ") had created bogus versions of Slashdot and Linkedln, so that
when employees from the telecommunications firm Belgacom tried to
access the sites from corporate computers, their requests were diverted to
the replica sites that then injected malware into their machines.10
As a result of the growing public awareness of these programs, U.S.
companies have lost revenues, even as non-U.S. firms have benefited." In
6. Nicole Perlroth, et al., N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-muchintemet-encryption.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0.
7. Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Collects Millions of E-mail Address
Books Globally, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-booksglobally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11 e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f _story.html.
8. Gellman & Soltani, supra note 1.
9. James Ball, et al., Revealed: How US and UK Spy Agencies Defeat Internet
Privacy and Security, THE GUARDIAN
(Sept.
6,
2013,
8:24
PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security.
10. Steven Levy, How the NSA Almost Killed the Internet, WIRED (Jan. 7, 2014,
6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/01/how-the-us-almost-killed-the-internet/all/.
11. See, e.g., Sam Gustin, NSA Spying Scandal Could Cost U.S. Tech Giants
Billions, TIME (Dec. 10, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/12/10/nsa-spyingscandal-could-cost-u-s-tech-giants-billions/ ("The National Security Agency spying
scandal could cost the top U.S. tech companies billions of dollars over the next several
years, according to industry experts. In addition to consumer Internet companies,
hardware and cloud-storage giants like IBM, Hewlett-Packard, and Oracle could suffer
billions of dollars in losses."); Ellen Messmer, U.S. High-Tech Industry Feeling the
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addition, numerous countries, concerned about consumer privacy as well as
the penetration of U.S. surveillance efforts in the economic and political
spheres, have accelerated data localization initiatives, begun restricting
U.S. companies' access to local markets, and introduced new privacy
protections, with implications for the future of Internet governance and
U.S. economic growth. These effects raise attendant concerns about U.S.
national security.
It could be argued that some of these effects, such as data localization
initiatives, are merely opportunistic-i.e., other countries are merely using
the NSA revelations to advance national commercial and political
interests.1 2 Even if true, however, the NSA programs provide other
countries with an opportunity. They have weakened the U.S. hand in the
international arena.
Congress has the ability to redress the current situation. First, and most
importantly, reform of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act would
Second, new
provide for greater restrictions on NSA surveillance.
domestic legislation could extend better protections to consumer privacy.
These shifts would allow U.S. industry legitimately to claim a change in
circumstance, which would help them to gain competitive ground. Third,
the integration of economic concerns at a programmatic level within the
national security infrastructure would help to ensure that economic matters
remain central to national security determinations in the future.

&

Heat from Edward Snowden Leaks, NETWORKWORLD, (July 19, 2013, 3:44 PM),
http://www.networkworld.com/article/2168328/security/u-s-high-tech-industryfeeling-the-heat-from-edward-snowden-leaks. html ("The disclosures about the National
Security Agency's massive global surveillance by Edward Snowden, the former
information-technology contractor who's now wanted by the U.S. government for
treason, is hitting the U.S. high-tech industry hard as it tries to explain its involvement
in the NSA data-collection program."); Claire Cain Miller, Revelations of N.S.A. Spying
Cost U.S. Tech Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
03/22/business/fallout-from-snowden-hurting-bottom-line-of-tech-companies.html
?_r-0 (writing, "Despite the tech companies' assertions that they provide information
on their customers only when required under law - and not knowingly through a back
door - the perception that they enabled the spying program has lingered.");
Surveillance Costs: The NSA's Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom

Cybersecurity,

NEw

AMERICA'S

OPEN

TECH.

INST.

2

(July

2014),

http://oti.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Surveilance
Costs Final.pdf ("American companies have reported declining sales overseas and
lost business opportunities, especially as foreign companies turn claims for products
that can protect users from NSA spying into a competitive advantage.").
12. See, e.g., Jonah Force Hill, The Growth of Data Localization Post-Snowden:
Analyses and Recommendations for U.S. Policymakers and Industry Leaders,
LAWFARE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES (July 21, 2014) (arguing that protectionism,
domestic surveillance and law enforcement, control of information and censorship, and
populist politics and anti-globalization, and not the NSA programs, serve as the
underlying motivation).
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I. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF NSA PROGRAMS

The NSA programs, and public awareness of them, have had an
immediate and detrimental impact on the U.S. economy. They have cost
U.S. companies billions of dollars in lost sales, even as companies have
seen their market shares decline. American multinational corporations
have had to develop new products and programs to offset the revelations
and to build consumer confidence. At the same time, foreign entities have
seen revenues increase. Beyond the immediate impact, the revelation of
the programs, and the extent to which the NSA has penetrated foreign data
flows, has undermined U.S. trade agreement negotiations. It has spurred
data localization efforts around the world, and it has raised the spectre of
the future role of the United States in Internet governance. Even if
opportunistic, these shifts signal an immediate and long-term impact of the
NSA programs, and public knowledge about them, on the U.S. economy.
A. Lost Revenues and DecliningMarket Share
Billions of dollars are on the line because of worldwide concern that the
services provided by U.S. information technology companies are neither
secure nor private.' 3 Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent than in cloud
computing.
Previously, approximately 50% of the worldwide cloud computing
revenues derived from the United States.' 4 The domestic market thrived:
between 2008 and 2014, it more than tripled in value.' 5 But within weeks
of the Snowden leaks, reports had emerged that U.S. companies such as
Dropbox, Amazon Web Services, and Microsoft's Azure were losing
business.' 6 By December 2013, ten percent of the Cloud Security Alliance
had cancelled U.S. cloud services projects as a result of the Snowden
information.' 7
In January 2014 a survey of Canadian and British

13. IT Industries Set to Lose Billions Because of Privacy Concerns, UNITED PRESS
INT'L, (Dec. 17, 2013, 9:20 PM), http://www.upi.com/BusinessNews/SecurityIndustry/2013/12/17/IT-industries-set-to-lose-billions-because-of-privacyconcems/UPI-30251387333206/ ("Information technology companies stand to lose
billions of dollars of business because of concerns their services are neither secure nor
private.").
14. GartnerPredict Cloud Computing Spending to Increase by 100% in 2016, Says
AppsCare, PRWEB (July 19, 2012), http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/7/prweb
9711167.htm.
15. Id.
16. David Gilbert, Companies Turn to Switzerlandfor Cloud Storage Following
NSA Spying Revelations, INT'L Bus. TIMEs, (July 4, 2013, 2:33 PM),
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/business-turns-away-dropbox-towards-switzerland-nsa486613.
17. Mieke Eoyang & Gabriel Horwitz, Op-Ed., NSA Snooping's Negative Impact
on Business Would Have the Founding Fathers 'Aghast, FORBES (Dec. 20, 2013, 8:00
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businesses found that one quarter of the respondents were moving their
data outside the United States.' 8
The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation estimates that
declining revenues of corporations that focus on cloud computing and data
storage alone could reach $35 billion over the next three years.1 9 Other
commentators, such as Forrester Research analyst James Staten, have put
actual losses as high as $180 billion by 2016, unless something is done to
restore confidence in data held by U.S. companies.20
The monetary impact of the NSA programs extends beyond cloud
computing to the high technology industry. Cisco, Qualcomm, IBM,
Microsoft, and Hewlett-Packard have all reported declining sales as a direct
result of the NSA programs. 2' Servint, a webhosting company based in
Virginia, reported in June 2014 that its international clients had dropped by
50% since the leaks began. 2 2 Also in June, the German government
announced that because of Verizon's complicity in the NSA program, it
would end its contract with the company, which had previously provided
services to a number of government departments. 23 As a senior analyst at
the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation explained, "It's
clear to every single tech company that this is affecting their bottom line."2 4
The European commissioner for digital affairs, Neelie Kroes, predicts that
http://snewsi.com/id/1342616710/NSA-Snoopings-Negative-Impact-OnAM),
Business-Would-Have-The-Founding-Fathers-Aghast.
18. NSA Scandal: UK and Canadian Business Wary of Storing Data in the US,
PEER 1 HOSTING, (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.peerl.com/news-update/nsa-scandal-ukand-canadian-businesses-wary-storing-data-in-us.
19. Id.; see also Mary DeRosa, U.S. Cloud Services Companies Are Paying Dearly
for NSA Leaks, NEXTGOV (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.nextgov.com/technologynews/tech-insider/2014/03/us-cloud-services-companies-are-paying-dearly-nsaleaks/8 1100/ (reporting estimates of losses of $22 billion over the next three years).
20. IT Industries Set to Lose Billions Because of Privacy Concerns, supra note 13.
This number includes domestic customers who may go elsewhere to find greater
privacy protections. See Gustin, supra note 11.
21. Sean Gallagher, NSA Leaks Blamed for Cisco's Falling Sales Overseas
(Updated), ARs TECHNICA, (Dec. 11, 2013, 5:05 AM), http://www.arstechnica.com/
information-technology/2013/12/nsa-leaks-blamed-for-ciscos-failing-sales-overseas/;
Paul Taylor, Cisco Warns Emerging Market Weakness is no Blip, FIN. TIMES, (Dec. 13,
2013, 12:07 AM), http:www/ft/com/intl/cms/s/0/tb757c4e-637b-11e3-a87d-00144fe
abdcO.html#axzz3lLJr3OGr; Spencer E. Ante, Qualcomm CEO Says NSA Fallout
Impacting China Business, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 22, 2013, http://www.online.wsj.com/
9 2 14 3 3
5 7838 4 2 06 2 ; Miller, supra note 11.
articles/SB1000142405270230 4 3 3 7 4 0457
22. Julian Hattem, Tech Takes Hit from NSA, THE HILL (June 30, 2014, 6:00 AM),
http://thehill.com/policy/technology/210880-tech-takes-hit-from-nsa.
23. Andrea Peterson, German Government to Drop Verizon over NSA Spying
Fears, WASH. POST, June 26, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/theswitch/wp/2014/06/26/german-government-to-drop-verizon-over-nsa-spying-fears/.
24. Id.
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the fallout for U.S. businesses in the EU alone will amount to billions of
Euros.2 5

Not only are U.S. companies losing customers, but they have been
forced to spend billions to add encryption features to their services. IBM
has invested more than a billion dollars to build data centers in London,
Hong Kong, Sydney, and elsewhere, in an effort to reassure consumers
outside the United States that their information is protected from U.S.
government surveillance.26 Salesforce.com made a similar announcement
in March 2014.27 Google moved to encrypt terms entered into its
browser.28 In June 2014 it took the additional step of releasing the source
code for End-to-End, its newly-developed browser plugin that allows users
to encrypt email prior to it being sent across the Internet. 2 9 The following
month Microsoft announced Transport Layer Security for inbound and
outbound email, and Perfect Forward Secrecy encryption for access to
OneDrive. 30 Together with the establishment of a Transparency Center,
where foreign governments could review source code to assure themselves
of the integrity of Microsoft software, the company sought to put an end to
both NSA back door surveillance and doubt about the integrity of
Microsoft products. 3 1
Foreign technology companies, in turn, are seeing revenues increase.
Runbox, for instance, an email service based in Norway and a direct
competitor to Gmail and Yahoo, almost immediately made it publicly clear
that it does not comply with foreign court requests for its customers'
personal information. 32 Its customer base increased 34% in the aftermath
of the Snowden leaks. 33 Mateo Meier, CEO of Artmotion, Switzerland's

25. Eoyang & Horwirz, supra note 17.
26. Miller, supra note 11.
27. Id.
28. Danny Sullivan, Post-PRISM, Google Confirms Quietly Moving to Make All
Searches Secure, Except for Ad Clicks, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Sept. 23, 2013, 11:53
AM) http://searchengineland.com/post-prism-google-secure-searches-172487.
29. Klint Finley, Google Renews Battle with the NSA by Open Sourcing Email
Encryption Tool, WIRED (June 3, 2014, 7:41 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/06/endto-end/.
30. Matt Thomlinson, Advancing our Encryption and Transparency Efforts,
MICROSOFT (July 1, 2014), http://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2014/07/01/
advancing-our-encryption-and-transparency-efforts/; see also Carly Page, Microsoft
Installs Tougher Outlook and Onedrive Encryption to Curb NSA Snooping, THE
INQUIRER, (July 1, 2014, 3:36 PM), http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/
2353073/microsoft-installs-better-outlook-and-onedrive-encryption-to-curb-nsasnooping.
31. Thomlinson, supra note 30.
32. Miller, supra note 11.
33. Id.
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biggest offshore data hosting company, reported that within the first month
of the leaks, the company saw a 45% rise in revenue.34 Because
Switzerland is not a member of the EU, the only way to access data in a
Swiss data center is through an official court order demonstrating guilt or
liability; there are no exceptions for the United States.
In April 2014,
Brazil and the EU, which previously used U.S. firms to supply undersea
cables for transoceanic communications, decided to build their own cables
between Brazil and Portugal, using Spanish and Brazilian companies in the
process. 36 OpenText, Canada's largest software company, now guarantees
customers that their data remains outside the United States. Deutsche
Telekom, a cloud computing provider, is similarly gaining more
customers.37 Numerous foreign companies are marketing their products as
"NSA proof' or "safer alternatives" to those offered by U.S. firms, gaining
market share in the process.
B. Trade Agreements
The NSA programs, and media coverage of them, have further impacted
bi- and multi-lateral trade negotiations, undermining U.S. economic
security. Consider two of the most important talks currently underway: the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the TransPacific Partnership (TPP).
TTIP is a trade and investment negotiation that is being conducted
between the European Commission and the United States. The purpose of
the agreement is to create better trade relations between the two region,
enabling companies on both sides of the Atlantic to thrive. The revelations
about NSA activities have had a profound impact on the negotiations.
In March 2014 the European Parliament passed a resolution noting "the
It stated, "the revelations based on
impact of mass surveillance."
documents leaked by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden put political
leaders under the obligation to address the challenges of overseeing and
controlling intelligence agencies in surveillance activities and assessing the
impact of their activities on fundamental rights and the rule of law in a
democratic society." 3 9 It recognized that the programs had undermined

34.

Gilbert, supra note 16.

35. Id.
36. Miller, supra note 11.
37. Id.
38. Mark Scott, European Firms Turn Privacy into Sales Pitch, N.Y. TIMES, June
11, 2014, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/1 1/european-firms-turn-privacy-intosales-pitch/.
39. European Parliament Resolution of Mar. 12, 2014 on the Surveillance
Programme, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&
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"trust between the EU and the US as transatlantic partners." Not least were
concerns that the information could be used for "economic and industrial
espionage"-and not merely for the purpose of heading off potentially
violent threats. Parliament strongly emphasized, "given the importance of
the digital economy in the relationship and in the cause of rebuilding EUUS trust," that its "consent to the final TTIP agreement could be
endangered as long as the blanket mass surveillance activities and the
interception of communications in EU institutions and diplomatic
representations are not completely abandoned and an adequate solution is
found for the data privacy rights of EU citizens." The resolution
underscored that any agreement to TTIP would hinge on the protection of
the data privacy rights as reflected in the protection of fundamental rights
in the EU Charter.40
Even if the surveillance programs do not entirely derail TTIP, they have
the potential to significantly retard negotiations.4 1 Much is at stake. The
Center for Economic Policy Research in London, for instance, estimates
that a successful TTIP could improve U.S. workers' wages, provide new
42Ante
jobs, and increase the country's GDP by $100 billion per year. Another
study, conducted by the Bertelsmann Foundation, suggests that TTIP
"could increase GDP per capita in the United States by 13 percent over the
long term."4 3 To the extent that the programs weaken the U.S. position in
the negotiations, the impact could be significant.44
Although the United States Trade Representative is trying to counter the
political fallout from the NSA debacle by putting local data protection
initiatives on the table in the TTIP negotiations, the EU has steadfastly
resisted any expansion into this realm.
TPP, in turn, is a trade agreement that the United States is negotiating
with 11 countries in the Asia-Pacific region (Australia, Brunei Darussalam,
language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2014-0230.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Patrick Donahue and Arne Delfs, Germany Demands U.S. Honesty on
Spying after Expulsion, BLOOMBERG Bus., July 11, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2014-07-10/germany-kicks-out-u-s-spy-as-relations-decline-to-low.
42. William Schomberg and Roberta Rampton, Credit Markets: EU, U.S. Leaders
Launch
Free-trade Talks,
REUTERS,
(June
17,
2013,
1:52
PM),
http://mobile.reuters.com/article/creditMarkets/idUSBRE95GOMD20130617.
43. Id.; see also Gabriel Felbermayr, et al., Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP): Who Benefits from a Free Trade Deal?, Part 1: Macroeconomic
Effects, BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG FOUNDATION, available at http://www.bfna.org/
sites/default/files/TTIP-GED%20study%2017June%202013.pdf.
44. Even if NSA surveillance doesn't derail the TTIP, it could certainly slow it
down. The Center for Economic Policy Research in London predicts the TTIP would
improve wages, provide new job opportunities, and increase U.S. GDP by $127 billion
per year. A study commissioned by Bertelsmann Foundation says the TTIP "could
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Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore,
and Vietnam). TPP (with participation of Japan), accounts for nearly 40%
of global GDP, about 1/3 of world trade. Two of the United States'
objectives in these negotiations are directly implicated by the Snowden
releases: e-commerce / telecommunications, and intellectual property
rights.
The NSA programs relate to a number of categories under ecommerce-such as rules preventing discrimination based on the country
of origin, and efforts to construct a single, global Internet. Nevertheless, as
discussed below, some of the countries involved in TPP have already
adopted data localization laws. The NSA programs have thus weakened
the United States' negotiation position in these discussions, by making it
more difficult to reach agreement in key areas.
In addition to e-commerce considerations, as part of the TPP
negotiations, the United States has prioritized intellectual property rights.
Some 40 million American jobs are directly or indirectly tied to "IPintensive" industries. These jobs tend to be high-paying and stimulate
approximately 60% of U.S. merchandise exports, as well as a significant
portion of services. Efforts to make progress in TPP by developing
stronger protections for patents, trademarks copyrights, and trade secretsincluding safeguards against cyber theft of trade secrets-is made more
perilous by the existence of the NSA programs.
C. Data Localization and Data Protection
Over the past eighteen months, countries around the world have
increasingly adopted data localization laws, restricting the storage, analysis,
and transfer of digital information to national borders.4 5 To some extent,
the use of barriers to trade as a means of incubating tech-based industries
predated the Snowden releases.46 In the aftermath of the leaks, the dialogue
has gained momentum. The asserted purpose is to protect government data
and consumer privacy.
As of the time of writing, China, Greece, Malaysia, Russia, South Korea,
Venezuela, Vietnam, Iran, and others have already implemented local data
server requirements. 4 7 Turkey has introduced new privacy regulations
45. See Jonah Force Hill, The Growth of Data Localization Post-Snowden:
Analysis and Recommendations for U.S. Policymakers and Industry Leaders, 2
LAWFARE RES. PAPER SERIES

(2014).

46. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ezell, el al., Localization Barriers to Trade: Threat to the
Global Innovation Economy, THE INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. (Sept. 25, 2013),
available at http://www2.itif.org/201 3-localization-barriers-to-trade-exec-summary

.pdf.
47. Heads Up for Privacy, Data Protection and Cybersecurity in 2014, SIDLEY
AuSTIN LLP (Dec. 30, 2013) http://m.sidley.com/ring-in-the-new-things-to-watch-in-
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preventing the transfer of personal data (particularly locational data)
overseas.48 Others, such as Argentina, India, and Indonesia are actively
considering new laws, even as Brazilian president, Dilma Rousseff, has
been promoting a law that would require citizens' personal data to be
stored within domestic bounds. 4 9 Germany and France are considering a
Schengen routing system, retaining as much online data in the European
Union as possible.so
As a regional matter, the European Union (EU) Commission's Vice
President, Viviane Reding, is pushing for Europe to adopt more expansive
privacy laws. 5 In March 2014, the European Parliament passed the Data
Protection Regulation and Directive, imposing strict limits on the handling
of EU citizens' data. 52 Reding announced, "The message the European
Parliament is sending is unequivocal: This reform is a necessity, and now it
is irreversible. Europe's directly elected parliamentarians have listened to
European citizens and European businesses and, with this vote, have made
clear that we need a uniform and strong European data protection law,
which will. . . strengthen the protection of our citizens." 53 Regardless of
where the information is based, those handling the data must obtain the
consent of the data subjects to having their personal information processed.
They also retain the right to later withdraw consent. Those violating the
directive face steep fines, including up to five percent of revenues. 54 Apart

2014-12-23-2013/; The National Information Network, INT'L CAMPAIGN FOR HUM.
RTs. IN IRAN, (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.iranhumanrights.org/2014/11/internetreportthe-national-information-network-national-internet/.
48. Richard Chirgwin, USA Opposes 'Schengen Cloud' Eurocentric Routing Plan,
THE REGISTER (Apr. 7, 2014, 12:58 AM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/04/07/
keepingdata away-from the usnoton ustr/.
49. Levy, supra note 10.
50. See, e.g., Jeanette Seiffert, Weighing a Schengen Zone for Europe's Internet
Data, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.dw.de/weighing-a-schengenzone-for-europes-intemet-data/a- 17443482 ; Interview by Louisa Schaefer with Philipp
Blank, Spokesperson, Deutsche Telekom (Oct. 18, 2013), available at
http://www.dw.de/deutsche-telekom-intemet-data-made-in-germany-should-stay-ingermany/a-17165891.
51. Eoyang & Horwitz, supra note 17.
52. European Parliament resolution of 12 Mar., 2014 on the Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement
of Such Data, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2014-0212+0+DOC+XML+VO/EN;
Press
Release,
European Commission, Progress on EU Data Protection Reform Now Irreversible
Following European
Parliament
Vote, (Mar.
12, 2014), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO-14-186_en.htm.
53. Press Release, Progress on EU Data Protection Reform supra note 52.
54. Id.
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from the new directive, the Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs
Committee of the European Parliament passed a resolution calling for the
end of the US/EU Safe Harbor agreement.55 Some 3000 U.S. companies
rely on this framework to conduct business with the EU.5 6
In May 2014, the EU Court of Justice ruled that users have a "right to be
forgotten" in their use of online search engines. 57 The case derived from a
complaint lodged against a Spanish newspaper, as well as Google Spain
and Google Inc., claiming that notice of the plaintiffs repossessed home on
Google's search engine infringed his right to privacy because the incident
had been fully addressed years before. He requested that the newspaper be
required to remove or alter the pages in question to excise data related to
him, and that Google Spain or Google Inc. be required to remove the
information.
The EU court found that even where the physical server of a company
processing information is not located in Europe, as long as the company
has a branch or subsidiary and is doing business in a Member state, the
1995 Data Protection Directive applies. 59 Because search engines contain
personal data, they are subject to such data protection laws. The court
recognized that, under certain conditions, individuals have the "right to be
forgotten"-i.e., the right to request that search engines remove links
containing personal information. Data that is inaccurate, inadequate,
irrelevant, or excessive may be removed. Not absolute, the right to be
forgotten must be weighed against competing rights, such as freedom of
expression and the media. 6 0
Various country-specific privacy laws are similarly poised to be
55. Press Release, European Parliament, NSA Snooping; MEPs Table Proposals to
available at
2014)
12,
(Feb.
Privacy
Citizens'
EU
Protect
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/newsroom/content/201402101PR35501/html/NSA-snooping-MEPs-table-proposals-toprotect-EU-citizens'-privacy.
56. Alex Byers, Tech Safe Harbor Under Fire in Europe, POLITICO MORNING
6, 2013, 10:27 AM), http://www.politico.com/morningtech/1113/
TECH (Nov.
momingtechl2137.html.
57. Google Spain v. Agencia Espatiola de Protecci6n de Datos, Case C-131/12, ¶ 9194 (2014), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?
doclang=EN&text&pagelndex=0&part=1&mode=DOC&docid=152065&occ=first&di
r&cid=437838.
58. See id.
59. See id.; see also Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 OJ. (L
281) 31.
60. See Google Spain, Case C-131/12, available at http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document print.jsf?doclang=EN&text&pagelndex=0&part-1 &mode=
DOC&docid=1 52065&occ=first&dir&cid=437838.
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introduced.
Their potential economic impact is substantial.
The
Information Technology and Innovation Fund estimates that data privacy
rules could retard the growth of the technology industry by up to four
percent, impacting U.S. companies' ability to expand and forcing them out
of existing markets. 6 1
The current dialogue is merely the latest in a series of growing concerns
about the absence of effective privacy protections within the U.S. legal
regime. High tech companies appear to see this as a concern. As
Representative Justin Amash (MI-R) has explained, "Businesses
increasingly recognize that our government's out-of-control surveillance
hurts their bottom line and costs American jobs. It violates the privacy of
their customers and it erodes American businesses' competitive edge." 62
It is with the impact of lack of privacy controls in the surveillance sphere
on U.S. competitiveness in mind that, in December 2013, some of the
largest U.S. Internet companies launched a campaign to pressure the
government to reform the NSA programs. Microsoft General Counsel Brad
Smith explained: "People won't use technology they don't trust." He
added, "Governments have put this trust at risk, and governments need to
help restore it." 63
Numerous high technology CEOs supported the
initiative, such Google's Larry Page, Yahoo's Marissa Mayer, and
Facebook's Mark Zuckerberg.64 The aim is to limit government authority
to collect user data, to institute better oversight and accountability, to
ensure greater transparency about what the government is requesting (and
obtaining), to increase respect for the free flow of data across borders, and
to avoid political clashes on a global scale. Mayer, explained, "Recent
revelations about government surveillance activities have shaken the trust
of our users, and it is time for the United States government to act to
restore the confidence of citizens around the world."6
D. Internet Governance
From the inception of the Internet, the U.S.-based Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) has governed the web. As
time has progressed, and the Internet has become part of the global
infrastructure, there have been calls from several nations to end U.S.

61. Michael Hickens, Spying Fears Abroad Hurt U.S. Tech Firms, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 3, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230374360457935
0611848246016.
62. Gustin, supra note 11.
63. Brad Smith, TWITTER (Dec. 8, 2013), https://twitter.com/BradSmi/status/
409912923952140289.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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dominance and to have the International Telecommunication Union (ITU),
an entity within the UN, become the governing body. 66 The global
backlash against the NSA programs raises question about the future of
Internet governance. The revelations have not only contributed further to
such calls, but they have spurred increased discussion of the need for
regional Internet control.67
Over the past decade, three main groups have emerged to vie for control
of the Internet. The first is centered on states, who consider the question in
light of national sovereignty. It is comprised of developing countries as
well as large, emerging economies like China, Russia, Brazil, and South
Africa.68 It overlaps significantly with the Group of 77 (consisting of more
than 100 countries which emerged from the non-aligned movement in the
Cold War). These states are critical of the United States and its dominant
role in Internet governance and oppose private sector preeminence, on the
grounds that they are pawns of the United States. 69 Emphasis instead is
placed on the UN and the ITU as potential repositories of Internet
authority. The second group is civil society. The third is the private sector.
These groups tend to support what is referred to as a "multistakeholder
model:" i.e., native Internet governance institutions that are generally
nonprofit entities in the private sector. 70 Membership includes both
technical experts (e.g., ICANN and Regional Internet Registries), as well as
multinational corporations (e.g., Microsoft, Facebook, and AT&T). Prior
to the Snowden releases, Japan, the EU, and the United States found
themselves in this camp. Civil society organizations emphasize Internet
freedom, consumer privacy, and user rights-often bringing them into
conflict with the states who comprise the G77-type group.7 1 As one
66. See Eric Pfanner, U.S. Rejects Telecommunications Treaty, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
13,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/14/technology/I 4iht-treatyl 4.html?
pagewanted= 1.
67. See, e.g., ICANN, https://www.icann.org/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
68. Milton Mueller & Ben Wagner, Finding a Formulafor Brazil: Representation
and Legitimacy in Internet Governance 3 (2014), (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the University of Pennsylvania Annenberg School Internet Policy Observatory
Working Paper Series), available at http://www.internetgovernance.org/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/MiltonBenWPdraftFinal.pdf.
69. See, e.g., Amanda Holpuch, Brazil's Controversial Plan to Extricate the
Internet From
U.S.
Control,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
20,
2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/20/brazil-dilma-rousseff-internet-uscontrol ("Rousseff proposed a set of ambitious, and controversial, measures that
include: constructing submarine cables that do not route through the US, building
internet exchange points in Brazil, creating an encrypted email service through the state
postal service and having Facebook, Google and other companies-store data by
Brazilians on servers in Brazil.").
70. Id.
71. Id.
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commentator explains, "This alignment of actors has been in place since
the 2003 World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) meetings. But
the Snowden NSA revelations seem to have destabilized this settled
political alignment." 72
In the wake of the Snowden documents, ICANN and Brazil have formed
an alliance, condemning U.S. actions. Concern about the latest revelations
spurred a major conference in April 2014, the Global Multistakeholder
Conference on the Future of Internet Governance. The purpose of the

meeting, which was held in Sao Paulo, was "to produce universal internet
principles and an institutional framework for multi-stakeholder Internet
governance."
It is not clear how the newest shifts will be resolved--either temporarily
or in the future. But significant questions have been raised: How should
the Internet governance be structured to ensure legitimacy and compliance?
Who gets to make the decision about what such governance looks like?
Which bodies have the authority to establish future rules and procedures?
How are such bodies constituted and who selects their membership?
These questions are fundamentally at odds with the decentralization
tendencies in the Internet-tendencies that have been exaggerated postSnowden as a result of regional efforts to expand the local sphere of
influence and to protect consumer and state privacy from U.S. surveillance.
The U.S. government's failure to address the situation domestically has
undermined the tech industry. Despite calls from the companies for
legislative reform to address the breadth of the NSA programs,7 4 there has
been no significant shift that would allow companies to approach their
customers to say, with truth, that the situation has changed. Resultantly,
American companies are losing not just customers, but also the opportunity
to submit proposals for contracts for which they previously would have
been allowed to compete.7 5 The future of Internet governance hangs in the
balance.
II. ECONOMIC SECURITY AS NATIONAL SECURITY

The NSA programs illustrate lawmakers' failure to recognize the degree
to which economic strength is central to national security, as well as the
importance of the high technology industry to the U.S. economy.

72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Gustin, supra note 11 (reporting that the nation's largest Internet
companies are calling for Congress and the Administration to reform the secret
surveillance programs).
75. Miller, supra note 11.
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The concept of economic security as national security is not new: the
Framers and the generations that followed acknowledged the importance of
economic strength as central to national security. Our more recent
understandings, however, have gotten away from the concept, in the
process cleaving important interests out of the calculations required to
accurately understand the implications of government actions. Unintended
consequences have resulted. The Snowden leaks, for instance, may have
driven bad actors to seek non-U.S. companies for ISP services, creating
gaps in insight into their operations. They have also undermined U.S.
efforts to call other countries to heel for their exploitation of international
communications to gain advantages over U.S. industry. The expansive
nature of the programs may well have acted to undermine U.S. national
security in myriad ways linked to the country's economic interests.
A. Economic Securityfrom the Founding

Despite its appearance throughout U.S. history, the term "national
security" is rarely defined in law.76 The 1947 National Security Act, for
instance, which, inter alia, constituted the National Military Establishment
(later the Department of Defense), and the National Security Council,
refers to "national security" more than 100 times; yet, it does not define the
term.77 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 employs the
term nearly a dozen times, to ascertain what matters fall within the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court's purview, who can certify an application
to FISC, and under what conditions in camera and ex parte proceedings
can be held.78 Where the Attorney General ascertains that a national
security threat exists, officials may secretly search and seize propertywaiting notice otherwise required under the Fourth Amendment.79 But no
definition is provided in FISA. Nor does the USA PATRIOT Act prove
more illuminating-despite referring to national security more than two
dozen times.80

Definitions of national security that are found in the U.S. Code tend to
limit consideration to foreign affairs and matters related to military
strength.8 ' Under the Classified Information Procedures Act, "national
76. See Laura K. Donohue, The Limits of National Security, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1573, 1579 (2011).
77. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-235, 61 Stat. 495 (current
version at 50 U.S.C. § 401 (2012)).
78. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803(e), 1804(a), 1806(f), and 1845(f) (2012).
79. 50 USC §1825(b) (2012).
80. See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Require to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, §505, 115 Stat. 272, 365-66.
81. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 948a(8) (2012) ("The term 'national security' means the
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security" is understood as involving matters related to the "national defense
and foreign relations of the United States." 82 Nowhere does the definition
reference U.S. economic security.
In the amended National Security Act, while the term could potentially
be understood to encompass U.S. economic security, the actual definition
does not specify a precise link to economic vitality. Instead, "intelligence
related to national security" refers to:
all intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived and
including information gathered within or outside the United States, that
(A) pertains, as determined consistent with any guidance issued by the
President, to more than one United States Government agency; and
(B) that involves(i) threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests;
(ii) the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; or
(iii) any other matter bearing on United States national or homeland
security.83

The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (providing
rules for government-wide information security) similarly fails to consider
the economic underpinnings of national security, instead, understanding
"national security systems" as any system:
(i) the function, operation, or use of which
(I) involves intelligence activities;
(II) involves cryptologic activities related to national security;
(III) involves command and control of military forces;
(IV) involves equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or
weapons system; or
(V) subject to subparagraph (B), is critical to the direct fulfillment of
military or intelligence missions; or
(ii) is protected at all times by procedures established for information
that have been specifically authorized under criteria established by an
Executive order or an Act of Congress to be kept classified in the interest
of national defense or foreign policy. 84
While there may be room in the definition for economic considerations,
they are not front and center.
Executive Branch articulations are similarly unhelpful. President George
W. Bush's five-page National Security Presidential Directive I referred to

national defense and foreign relations of the United States.").
82. Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025, (codified

at 18 U.S.C. app. § 1(b) (2012)).
83. 50 U.S.C. § 3003(5) (2012).
84. 44 U.S.C. § 3542(b)(2)(A) (2012).
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"national security" thirty-three times, without any definition.85 President
Barak Obama's Presidential Policy Directive 1 ("PPD-1"), in turn,
addressing the National Security Council, referred to "national security"
thirty-three times-without ever defining it. 86 Like the Executive Branch,
courts tend to look to the military and diplomatic aspects of national
security, instead of their economic concomitant. 8 7
Despite the lack of emphasis on economic strength in statutory
definitions, the Founders were well aware of the importance of the
The Articles of
economy in fostering international independence.
Confederation failed in significant part because the national government
lacked the resources, and the economic strength, to protect the Union. For
Alexander Hamilton, absent military might, diplomatic stature, and
commercial success, the country would cease to exist.
One of the first expansions of the executive, accordingly, was to include
a Secretary of the Treasury, which, along with the Secretary of War and the
establishment of the office of the Attorney General, reflected the purposes
for which Union had been sought: foreign relations, military strength,
economic growth, and the rule of law.89 In his Farewell Address, President
George Washington called for U.S. energies to be directed towards
strengthening the U.S. economy: "[T]he great rule of conduct for us in
regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial relations, to have
with them as little political connection as possible." 90
The federal government was willing, from a very early date, to act in
support of its commercial interests with whatever diplomatic, legal, and
military power it could muster. 9 1
85. National Security Presidential Directive on the Organization of the National
Security Council System (Feb. 13, 2001), available at http://www.fas.org/
irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd- 1.htm.
86. See Presidential Study Directive on Organizing for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism (Feb. 23, 2009), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/psd/psdI.pdf ("[C]onceptually and functionally, [national security and homeland security]
should be thought of together rather than separately.").
87. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring).

88.

FEDERALIST

No. 1, (Alexander Hamilton).

89. 19 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 125-26
(available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collld=lljc&fileName=019/lljc01
9.db&recNum=137&itemLink=r%3Fammem%2Fhlaw%3A%40field%28DOCID%2B
%401it%28jc0191%29%29%230190001&linkText-I)
90. President George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796), availableat
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18thcentury/washing.asp.
91. For a catalog of every military intervention in support of U.S. commercial
interests, see WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS, EMPIRE AS A WAY OF LIFE: AN ESSAY ON
THE CAUSES AND CHARACTER OF AMERICA'S PRESENT PREDICAMENT ALONG WITH A
FEW THOUGHTS ABOUT AN ALTERNATIVE (1st ed. 1980).
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History is telling. The Monroe Doctrine was premised largely on this
approach.92
In 1837, President Martin Van Buren came to office
determined to continue Washington's legacy, underscoring the importance
of avoiding entangling alliances while pursuing America's economic
interests abroad.
President Zachary Taylor came to office in 1849
determined to continue the course, emphasizing the importance of
bolstering trade as a means of securing the country. 9 4 The 1850 ClaytonBulwer Treaty ensured that future canal access through Central America
would be open to international trade.95
As Millard Fillmore succeeded Taylor, he considered commerce central
to U.S. interests abroad-for this reason, the Navy would require further
resources to protect trade along the Pacific Coast.96 Upon taking office,
President Franklin Pierce reiterated the same policies: of the complicated
European tumults and anxieties, the United States was to be exempt, "But
the vast interests of commerce are common to all mankind, and the
advantages of trade and international intercourse must always present a
noble field for the moral influence of a great people."
The United States went on to emphasize its dealings with Asia and to
sign an historic trade agreement with Japan.97 Expansionism, and the
economic benefits it brought, similarly proved central to U.S. national
security. "Should [new possessions] be obtained," Pierce asserted during his
InauguralAddress, "it will be through no grasping spirit, but with a view to
obvious national interest and security, and in a manner entirely consistent
with the strictest observance of national faith." From the 1898 SpanishAmerican War forward, the country promoted its national interests through
formative political, military, and economic engagement in the international
arena.
To the extent that the NSA programs, and public knowledge of them, has
harmed the U.S. economy, they have harmed U.S. national security. The
country's economic strength is part of what enables the United States to

92.

Mark Gilderhus, The Monroe Doctrine: Meanings and Implications, 36
Q. 5, 5-6 (2006) (describing Monroe Doctrine rhetoric as "a cover
for less ennobling purposes connected with the defense of strategic and economic
interests").
93. President Martin Van Buren, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1837), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25812.
94. President Zachary Taylor, Inaugural Address (Mar. 5, 1849), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th century/taylor.asp.
95. Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, art. 1, Apr. 19, 1850, 9 Stat. 995.
96. President Millard Fillmore, Message to Congress (Dec. 2, 1850), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2949 1.
97. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, July 29, 1858, 12 Stat. 1051, available at
http://core.ecu.edu/hist/tuckerjo/harris.html.
PRESIDENTIAL STUD.
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respond to external and internal threats. The ability to defend the country
against would-be aggressors requires resources-e.g., to build and equip a
military force, to move troops, to respond to attacks in whatever form they
may materialize. Many of the supplies needed to fend off overreaching by
either states or non-state actors derive not from government production, but
from the private sector. To the extent that a weak private sector emerges,
the government's ability to respond is harmed.
Beyond this, economic security allows the country the freedom to
determine its international and domestic policies on the merits, not on need.
Where the United States is in a strong economic position, it is less
vulnerable in international negotiations, such as those related to trade. It is
also in a politically superior position, where it can use its wealth to
accomplish the desired ends.
A strong economy also ensures that citizens have their needs met, with
sufficient income levels for housing, food, clothing, and education. This,
in turn, generates social and political stability, which allows for the
development of communities, which creates greater cohesion among
citizens. It also contributes to the evolution of democratic deliberations,
reinforcing the rule of law.
Economic security allows for growth and innovation, which is fed by
education and opportunity. Innovation, in turn, allows the country to
continue to adapt to the evolving environment and international context.
But these suffice to illustrate the
There are further considerations.
importance of economic strength to U.S. national security writ large.
High technology is central to the U.S. economy. A recent study by the
Bay Area Economic Council Institute sought to ascertain how important
the high tech industry is just for the U.S. labor market. It found that not
only are high-tech jobs critical for generating employment in other sectors,
but that growth in the high-tech sector has increasingly been happening in
areas of great economic and geographic diversity, suggesting that the hightech industry is not limited to one ethic, social, or economic strata.
High-technology has been one of the fastest-growing sectors: between
2004 and 2012, the employment growth in high-tech outpaced private
sector growth by a ratio of 3:1. Jobs in Science, Technology, Engineering,
and Mathematics (STEM) outpaced job gains across all occupations by a
ratio of 27:1.98 Employment predictions put the demand for high-tech
workers to increase 16.2% 2011 to 2020, with STEM employment
increasing 13.3% during the same period. 99
98. TECHNOLOGY WORKS: HIGH-TECH EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES IN THE UNITED
STATES, BAY AREA COUNCIL ECONOMIC INSTITUTE (Dec. 2012), available at

http://www.bayareaeconomy.org/media/files/pdf/TechReport.pdf.
99. Id.
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The study found that the generation of jobs in high-technology had farreaching effects. In addition to the income gains generated by innovation,
productivity and a global marketplace, high-technology industrial growth
generated other types of jobs. Health care, education, law, restaurants,
hotels and personal services, as well as goods-producing construction
sectors grew in tandem with high tech, largely because of a local multiplier
effect: "For each job created in the local high-tech sector," the study
concluded, "approximately 4.3 jobs are created in the local non-tradable
sector in the long run." 10 0
Even as early as 2002, the National Science Foundation found that the
global market for high-technology goods is growing at a swifter rate than
for other manufactured goods. More than this, "high-technology industries
are driving economic growth around the world." 01
This study built on one released in 1995 by the National Academies,
which had looked carefully at the role and importance of high tech
companies in the U.S. economy.102
Study after study reflects the importance of high-technology in the U.S.
economy. In 2015, a Brookings study found that "advanced industries"
(which include high-technology, STEM, and industries, like aerospace,
which are heavily dependent on advanced technologies), "represent a
sizable economic anchor for the U.S. economy."l 03 They led the postrecession recovery. Brookings found that with only 9 percent of the total
U.S. employment, advanced industries produce some $2.7 trillion per
year-around 17% of the country's GDP. Further, about 60 percent of
U.S. exports are tied to this sector, with 2.2 jobs being created domestically
for every new advanced industry job. In sum, "Directly and indirectly...
the sector supports almost 39 million jobs-nearly one-fourth of all U.S.
employment."' 04
What these numbers mean is that hits to high technology directly impact
the U.S. economy. The country's strength relies, in part, on wealth and
resources-particularly the production and consumption of goods and
services. With the economy so central to U.S. national security, one might

100. Id.
101. Industry, Technology, and the Global Marketplace, Sci. &

ENGINEERING

(2002), http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind02/c6/c6sl.htm#c6s11.
102. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERS, RISK AND INNOVATION: THE ROLE
IMPORTANCE OF SMALL, HIGH-TECH COMPANIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY (1995).
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103. Mark Muro, et al., America's Advanced Industries: What They Are, Where
They Are, and Why They Matter, BROOKINGS INST., 3 (Feb. 2015),

http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Research/Files/Reports/2015/02/03%20advanced%
20industries/final/AdvancedlndustryFinalFeb2lores.pdf.
104. Id.; see also id. at 10.
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be forgiven for assuming that economic interests-particularly those that
affect significant sectors-are well-represented in the institutional structure
that governs national security. Unfortunately, they are not.
B. National Security Infrastructure
The National Security Council ("NSC") is "the principal forum for
consideration of national security policy issues requiring Presidential
determination." 105 The President looks to the forum for advice and
assistance in matters ranging from domestic, foreign and military, to
intelligence and economic.' 06
It is thus surprising that the 1947 National Security Act includes neither
the Secretary of the Treasury, nor the Secretary of Commerce, as
permanent (statutory) members of the NSC. Instead, the entity is chaired
by the President, with formal membership extended to the Vice President,
the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. 07 The Chair of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff acts as the statutory military advisor, the Director of
National Intelligence as the statutory intelligence advisor, and the Director
of National Drug Control Policy as the statutory drug control policy
advisor.o8
Under PDD-1, the NSC includes the Secretary of Treasury, and "[w]hen
international economic issues are on the agenda of the NSC, the NSC's
regular attendees will include the Secretary of Commerce, the United States
Trade Representative, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy,
and the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers." 09
When the emphasis is not international economic issues, the structure
does not cement economic concerns into the discussion. Nor does it
contemplate the inclusion of Treasury or Commerce as an operational
matter-i.e., when the intelligence community is deciding whether to
develop a surveillance program. Such issues are not brought directly to the
NSC."10
To the extent that the failure to include these members at the most basic
level reflects a perspective that potentially sidelines economic concerns, the
continued failure to build in strong representation at a programmatic level
underscores the concern. Economic issues may be treated with seriousness,

105. Presidential Policy Directive on the Organization of the National Security
Council System (Feb. 13, 2009), availableat http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd- 1.pdf.

106. Id.
107.
108.
109.
110.

50 U.S.C. § 3021 (2012).
Id.
President Policy Directive, supra note 86.
DeRosa, supra note 19.
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but they are not meaningfully integrated into the national security
infrastructure.
C. UnintendedHarmful Consequences

There are various ways in which the NSA's apparent failure to take
account of the potential impact of public knowledge of the programs on
U.S. industry may have acted to undermine U.S. security beyond
weakening the economy. The backlash risks shielding foreign government
actions from public scrutiny. It potentially undermines the ability of the
United States to develop international norms against ubiquitous
surveillance, which can be used for political or economic espionage. And
it raises the possibility that the country will lose digital sight of active
threats against the United States.
As was previously noted, the data localization movement, given
momentum by the NSA revelations, risks the creation of distinct, parallel
Internets, which would stifle the free flow of information that connects not
just economies, but cultures and people, with potential rollbacks for an
increasingly globalized world. This would affect the country's interest in
democratic engagement and it would harm the United States' international
reach. The creation of national search engines, national email systems, and
national social networks, moreover, means that foreign governments will
have direct control over electronic communication networks, facilitating
censorship and domestic surveillance and limiting outside view of the
extent to which such steps are being taken.
When Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan, for instance, recently
tried to shut down Twitter, the international community was immediately
#TwitterisblockedinTurkey #dictatorerdogan, and
put on notice."'
#occupytwitter quickly moved to popular trending topics internationally."12
The United States, EU, and others formally objected to the action through
diplomatic channels. Had Turkey been an isolated network, it may have
secretly censored the politically damaging information (in this case, leaks
alleging corruption in the Erdogan government), without generating such
immediate, international attention.
Along the same lines, in July 2014 President Vladimir Putin signed a
new law requiring Internet companies to store all Russian users' data
within domestic borders. Russia's media and parliament members have
111. Kevin Rawlinson, Turkey Blocks Use of Twitter after Prime Minister Attacks
GUARDIAN, (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/mar/21 /turkey-blocks-twitter-prime-minister.
112. Id; Sebnem Arsu and Dan Bilefsky, In Turkey, Twitter Roars after Effort to
Block It, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/world/
europe/turks-seek-to-challenge-twitter-ban.html?_r-2.
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used Edward Snowden's leaks about NSA spying to rally support for the
new law." 3 The legislation serves to intensify Putin's control over Internet
companies.l 14 With internal data centers, it will be easier for the Russian
president to enforce censorship policies and to collect information about
members of the political opposition. The law could also give Putin an
excuse to shut down major social media networks if they fail to comply
with the new regulations.
The NSA revelations also have undermined U.S. credibility in
challenging other countries' efforts to obtain trade secrets and other
information through state surveillance. China provides one of the strongest
examples. Because of the NSA programs, U.S. objections to China selling
surveillance technology to oppressive regimes look rather weak. PostSnowden, Chinese efforts have become even more public and devastating
to U.S. interests.
Since 2005, when President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad first took office,
Iran has stated its plan to develop a national Internet network.' 15 In the
intervening decade, the country has been unable to do so. But in 2014
Iran's Ministry of Communications and Information Technology
announced that China would officially be collaborating with them on the
creation of the National Information Network.' 16 Part of Iran's aim has
been to develop a system that allows the country to turn off the
international components of the Internet, in a way that will enable the
government and domestic banking industry to continue to operate. With
more than half the population under age 35, Iran has a tech-savvy citizenry,
which has, to date, found various ways around government efforts to block

113. Yasha Levine, Putin Ramps Up Internet Censorship, citing Google and
Snowden
to Ensure Public Support, PANDODAILY
(Mar.
20,
2014)
http://pando.com/2014/03/20/putin-ramps-up-internet-censorship-citing-google-andsnowden-to-ensure-public-support/.
114. Sarah Gray, Putin Tightens Grip on Internet: Signs New Law Requiring Mass
Storage of Russians' Data, SALON (Jul. 23, 2014), http://www.salon.com/2014/
07/23/putin tightens grip on internet signs_newlaw requiring mass storage ofru
ssians data/.
115. Behrang Tajdin, Will Iran's National Internet Mean No World Wide Web?,
BBC NEWS (Apr. 27, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22281336.
116.
Engineer Jahangard, in his meeting with China's "Committee of
Information", announced that the countries will exchange their experiences in the field
of ICT (Internet Communication Technology ), Ministry of I.C.T., Feb. 10, 2015,
available at https://www.ict.gov.ir/fa/news/10162. See also Jessica McKenzie, When it
Comes to Internet Censorship, China and Iran Are All in This Together,
TECHPRESIDENT (Jan. 22, 2014), http://techpresident.com/news/wegov/24693/when-itcomes-internet-censorship-china-iran-are-all-together; China to Help Iran Implement
Its Closed National Internet, InternationalCampaignfor Human Rights in Iran, IRAN
HUMAN RIGHTS (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.iranhumanrights.org/2014/01/china-iraninternet/.na.
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social media and other international sources. It is not clear whether Iran
will be able to completely divest itself of access to the world wide web.
What is clear is that in a post-Snowden era, their efforts to do so are being
facilitated by countries with interests diametrically opposed to the United
States.
Online warfare between China and the United States simmered in the
background, until in early 2013 the Obama Administration began to make
it center stage. In January 2013, the New York Times reported that Chinese
hackers had infiltrated its computers following a threat that if the paper
insisted on publishing a story about its prime minister, consequences would
follow." 7

The following month, a security firm, Mandiant, revealed that

the Chinese military unit 61398 had stolen data from U.S. companies and
agencies." 8 In March 2013 President Obama's National Security Advisor
publicly urged China to reduce its surveillance efforts-after which
classified documents leaked to the public demonstrated the extent to which
China had infiltrated U.S. government servers."l 9 Two months later, the
National Security Advisor flew to China to lay the groundwork for a
summit, in which cyber surveillance would prove center stage.1 2 0 Two
days before the Obama-Xi meeting was scheduled to take place, The
Guardian ran the first story on the NSA programs.121 On June 7, when
Obama raised the question of Chinese espionage, Xi responded by quoting
The Guardian and suggesting that the U.S. should not be lecturing the
Chinese about surveillance.1 2 2 Although differences may mark the two
countries' approaches (e.g., in one case for economic advantage, in the
other for political or security advantage), the broader translation for the
global community has been one in which the United States has lost the high
ground to try to restrict cyber-surveillance.
A final point is worth noting in this context. To the extent that non-U.S.
companies are picking up customers and business overseas, the United
States' ability to conduct surveillance may be further harmed-thus going
directly to the country's national security interests. In other words, it may
be in the country's best interests to keep traffic routed through U.S.
companies, which would allow the national security infrastructure, with
appropriate legal process, to access the information in question. The

117. Kurt Eichenwald, How Edward Snowden Escalated Cyber War, NEWSWEEK
(Oct. 31, 2013, 7:22 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/2013/11/01/how-edwardsnowden-escalated-cyber-war-243886.html.
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apparent overreach of the NSA, however, may end up driving much of the
traffic elsewhere, making it harder for the United States to obtain the
information needed to protect the country against foreign threats.
III. STEPS REQUIRED To REDRESS THE CURRENT SITUATION
Numerous steps could be taken by Congress to address the situation in
which U.S. industry currently finds itself.
The most effective and
influential decision that legislators could take would be to curb the NSA's
authorities under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. This action has
two components: first, ending the telephony metadata collection program
and, second, restricting the use of to/from, or about collection under
upstream interceptions. Both programs would further benefit from greater
transparency, to make it clear that their aim is to prevent foreign aggression
and to prevent threats to U.S. national security-not to engage in the
interception of trade secrets or to build dossiers on other countries'
populations.
The second most effective change that could be undertaken would be to
introduce stricter privacy controls on U.S. companies, in the process
bringing the United States into closer line with the principles that dominate
in the EU. The two entities are not as far apart as the dialogue might lead
one to assume, and so changes required in this sphere would be minimal.
Together, these two alterations-curbing the NSA surveillance programs
and providing increased consumer protections for privacy-would allow
U.S. industry to argue changed circumstances to allow companies to again
become competitive for contracts and markets to which they seek access.
A third alteration that would make a substantial difference over the
longer term relates to the national security infrastructure. The current
failure of the United States to integrate economic concerns creates a
vulnerability for the country in terms of the breadth and depth of programs
subsequently adopted. New thought needs to be given on how to take on
board-and to mitigate-potentially devastating economic consequences of
government surveillance efforts.
A. FISA Alterations
In addition to its economic impact, the NSA program relating to
telephony metadata runs contrary to Congressional intent in introducing the
FISA, contradicts the statutory language, and violates the Fourth
Amendment.1 23 In 2014, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board
came to a similar conclusion,' 24 as did the President's own appointed

123. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection, supra note 1.
124. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE
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Review Group, charged with considering the telephony metadata collection
program, in 2013.125
Accordingly, the President announced on January 17, 2014 that he was
"ordering a transition that will end the Section 215 bulk metadata program
as it currently exists, and establish a mechanism that preserves the
capabilities we need without the government holding this bulk
metadata."l 26 The alternative approach was to be developed by March 28,
2014. Nine months later, on September 13, 2014, the FISC approved the
Department of Justices's ("DOJ") request to extend the program for
another 90 days-without any transition program in place. More than a
year after the announcement, a new program has yet to be put into place.
The President issued a new presidential directive for U.S. signals
intelligence activities, both at home and abroad. The classified nature of
parts of the document, international skepticism about the Administration's
commitment to privacy, and the failure of the Administration to make good
on its promise of transition to a new program meant that the global
community, with good reason, has questioned whether anything has really
changed.
As a matter of Section 702 and the interception of international content,
PRISM and Upstream collection present global concerns. Neither program
has yet to be addressed through any legislative change. The existence of
these programs, while perhaps statutorily consistent with the FISA
Amendments Act, as well as constitutionally sufficient with regard to the
interception of non-U.S. persons communications, where the individual is
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States, goes some way
towards undermining international confidence in U.S. companies.
The Fourth Amendment does not reach non-U.S. persons based overseas
who lack a substantial connection to the United States. 12 7 Writing for the
Court in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded that "the people" referred to in the Fourth Amendment indicate a
particular group-not merely people qua people.128 His reading stems from
a deeply Aristotelian approach: i.e., one that emphasizes membership in the

RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND
ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT (2014),

availableat https://www.eff.org/files/2014/01/23/final report 1-23-14.pdf.
125. PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC'NS TECHS., LIBERTY
AND
SECURITY
IN
A
CHANGING
WORLD,
(2013),
available at

http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/nsa-review-boards-report/674/.
126. Remarks on United States Signals Intelligence and Electronic Surveillance,
2014 DAILY COMP. Pres. Doc. 30 (Jan. 17, 2014).
127. Donohue, Section 702, supra note 1.
128. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (per curiam).
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government.129 As members of the polis, U.S. persons, both distributively
and collectively, obtain the protections of the Constitution.
Viewed in this regard, the Constitution itself embodies the collective
organization of "the people" into one entity. "U.S. persons" and "the
people" are, therefore, one and the same. The "right of the people" thus
refers to a collective group of individuals "who are part of a national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with
this country to be considered part of that community."l30
Very few cases address precisely what constitutes sufficient contact with
the United States to satisfy the "substantial connections" aspect of the
Those that do point in seemingly different
majority's decision.
3 1
At a minimum, however, it would be extraordinary to assume
directions.1
that simply because an individual uses a U.S. company, he or she thereby
gains the protections of the Fourth Amendment. This was the basic
argument underlying the "modernization" of FISA in the first place, to take
account of bad actors, communicating overseas, who would suddenly fall
within the more protective FISA regime merely because their
communications happened to come within U.S. territory by nature of the
carrier in question.
Even recognizing, however, that few constitutional barriers may apply to
the programmatic use of Section 702 insofar as it is applied to non-U.S.
persons (leaving aside the questions that accompany the incidental
collection of massive amounts of U.S. persons' information, including
entirely domestic conversations), as a matter of policy, both PRISM and the
use of to/from or about Upstream collection has dramatically undermined
U.S. industry. As a matter of policy, therefore, greater restrictions, more
transparency, and more effective oversight of the international collection of
content may help to alter the situation with regard to the skepticism
expressed towards U.S. companies.
The Obama Administration has begun to take steps to acknowledge the
importance of data privacy for European citizens, but its actions have thus
far been limited to law enforcement, excluding surveillance conducted for
national security purposes. In June 2014, Attorney General Eric Holder
announced that, as part of the EU-U.S. Data Protection and Privacy
Agreement, the Administration would work with Congress to provide EU
citizens the ability to seek redress in U.S. courts where personal data,
129. ARISTOTLE, POLITICs, bk. I (Benjamin Jowett trans.) (c. 350 B.C.E.), available
at http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.1.one.html.
130. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
131. Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet, 67 STAN. L. REV.

285, 308 (2015).
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shared with the United States by European countries for law enforcement
purposes is subsequently intentionally or willfully disclosed. 13 2 The Office
of the Director of National Intelligence claims this action as part of the
privacy-protective measures implemented in the wake of the Snowden
disclosures.13 3 The agreement, however, isdlimited to information provided
by European countries, making it somewhat beside the point. More
relevantly, the Administration supported the USA FREEDOM Act, which
would have prohibited the bulk collection of telephony metadata under
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act (as well as the Pen Registers and
Trap and Trace provisions of FISA and National Security Letters, which
appear in five parts of the U.S. Code). Congress, however, failed to pass
the USA FREDOM Act. Actions taken with regard to Section 702 have
been minimal and generally focused on U.S. persons.
B. Privacy Law Harmonization

Much ink has been spilled on the cultural and practical differences
between the United States and the EU with regard to data protection and
privacy law. These differences have been over-blown.
There are myriad ways in which the two regions reflect a similar
approach. Just as the United States' Fourth Amendment protects the right
to privacy, for instance, Article 8 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms embraces the
same.1 3 4These documents constitutionally ground two fundamental liberty
interests in their respective regions' governing frameworks: (a) the right to

132. Attorney General Holder Pledges Support for Legislation to Provide E. U.
Citizens with JudicialRedress in Cases of Wrongful Disclosureof Their PersonalData
Transferred to the U.S. for Law Enforcement Purposes, DEPT. OF JUSTICE June 25,
2014,
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attomey-general-holder-pledges-supportlegislation-provide-eu-citizens-judicial-redress.

133. Signals Intelligence Reform 2015 Anniversary Report, Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, IC ON THE RECORD, available at http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
ppd-28/201 5/privacy-civil-liberties ("In furtherance of its commitment to protecting
privacy in the law enforcement context, the Administration is working with Members
of Congress on legislation to give citizens of designated countries to the right to seek
judicial redress for intentional or willful disclosures of protected information, and for
refusal to grant access or to rectify any errors in that information.")
134. Compare U.S. CONST., amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. "), with Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, available at
http://coventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/treaties/html/005.htm ("Everyone has the right to
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.").
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privacy, and (b) freedom from arbitrary invasion of one's private sphere.1 3 5
In the European Union, these liberties are supported by EU-wide directives,
such as the 1995 European Data Protection Directive and the EU Internet
Privacy Law of 2002.136 Further, in both the EU and the U.S. such liberty
interests are protected through national legislation, in which a judicial
remedy is provided for a breach of the right to privacy.137 The manner in
which these rights are treated is similarly consistent. In both spheres, these
rights are offset against the obligations owed by the data holder to the
individual to whom the information relates.' 3 8
As a substantive matter, the two regions have adopted similar provisions.
In the EU and the U.S., for instance, heightened protections are provided

&

135. Compare U.S. CONST., amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. "), with Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, available at
http://coventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/treaties/html/005.htm ("Everyone has the right to
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.").
136. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31;
Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the
electronic communications sector, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37.
137. Compare Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, Recitation 55, 1995 O.J. (L
281) 31, 36, with U.S. statutory provisions related to privacy (including, inter alia: the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012); Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) (2012), Children's Internet Protection Act
of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 20 and 47 U.S.C.) (2012), Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of
1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2012), Fair Credit Reporting Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 16811681x (2012), Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725
(2012), Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) (2012), Financial
Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (2012), Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §
552a (2012), Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa-2000aa-12 (2012),
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2012), Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) (2012), Video Privacy Protection Act of
1988 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012), and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-19 1, 110 Stat. (codified as amended in scattered sections of
the U.S.C.) (2012).
138. Compare Recitation No. 25, 1995 O.J. (L281) 31,33 with Greenwald
MacAskill, supra note 1.
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for what is known as personally-identifiable information.1 3 9 A series of
exceptions to the dominant structure is provided in two central areas:
security (including, e.g., criminal law, public security, defense, and
national security) and freedom of expression (such as with regard to
journalism, literary pursuits, artistic expression, and political opinions).1 40
To ensure that the substantive measures reflect the underlying
constitutional principles, both regions insist on minimization-i.e., that the
information collected on individuals be limited to what is strictly necessary
for the purposes delineated by statute.141
Both the U.S. and the EU have established a set of substantive
requirements related to individuals' knowledge that data about them is
being collected, stored, and possibly shared with others. Consent, for
instance, is central to both systems.' 4 2
Much has been made in regard to the distinction between the opt-in
(European approach) versus the opt-out (American approach). 143 What has
been lost, however, is that both approaches rely on the consent of the
subject (subject to specific exceptions, above), in order to proceed with
data gathering, analysis, and distribution. To facilitate this structure, both
regions also require that notice be provided to targets and that individuals
have the right to access information that is held about them.1 44 Individuals,
in both systems, have the right to object to particular information, and in
both systems, the data holder has a duty to ensure that the information is
accurate and kept up to date.1 4 5

&

139. Compare, e.g., Recitation No. 26, 1995 OJ. (L 281) 31,33 with 5 U.S.C. §
552a.
140. Compare, e.g., Recitation Nos. 16 (national security), 17 (written and artistic
expressions), and 36 (political opinions), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 32 with Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (2012) (national security exceptions and
singling out of otherwise protected First Amendment activity). See also Council
Directive 2006/24 and Amending Directive 2002/58/EC, 2006 OJ. (L. 105) 54
(creating exceptions for criminal law).
141. Compare Recitation No. 28, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 34 with 92 Stat. 1783
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
142. Compare Recitation No. 30, 1995 OJ. (L 281) 31, 34 with Greenwalk
McAskill, supra note 1.
143. See, e.g., Gerhard Steinke, Data Privacy Approaches from U.S. and EU
perspectives, 19 TELEMATICS AND INFORMATICS 193, 196 (2002) (explaining the EU
Data Protection Directive requires consumers to opt -in before sensitive information is
disclosed to third parties); Tim Worstall, The EU Warns Tech Firms: Opt Out Is No
Longer Good Enough, FORBES (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
timworstall/2013/01/1 0/the-eu-warns-tech-firms-opt-out-is-no-longer-good-enough/.
144. Compare, e.g., Recitation Nos. 38 (notice) and 41 (right of access), 1995 O.J.
(L 281) 31, 35 with Greenwalk & McAskill, supra note 1.
145. Compare, e.g., 1995 OJ. (L 281) 31, 40, 43, (referring specifically to article 14
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Keeping in mind the consistencies between the two systems, and the
benefits to be gained for U.S. industry from emphasizing harmony, there
are two areas where the regions differ that could be addressed through
legislative reform: recognition of residual rights in third party data, and the
creation of a comprehensive, privacy-protective regime, as opposed to the
piecemeal approach that currently marks U.S. law.
1. Residual Rights in Third PartyData
One central question that divides the United States from numerous other
countries and regions-including the European Union-centers on who
owns an individual's data. In the United States, since Smith v. Maryland
(addressing pen registers and trap and trace devices), and U.S. v. Miller
(focusing on financial records), all three branches have treated information
held by third parties as lacking an individual right to privacy.1 4 6
In contrast, the EU considers that the individual who has provided data
to a third party to still have a privacy interest in the information.147 The
recent European Court decision, recognizing the right to anonymity,
necessarily presupposes a continued interest in data, even once it is
obtained by a third party.1 4 8
The difference between the approaches is central to understanding how
new technologies, such as social network analysis, cloud computing, and
data mining, have deepened the privacy interests implicated in third party
handling of data. New technologies allow information to be generated
about which, even those to whom the data relates are unaware. To say that
individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in this
information rather flies in the face of common sense.
The Supreme Court appears to be coming to this conclusion as well. In
United States v. Jones, the Court considered a case involving 28-day
surveillance involving the placement of a GPS chip on a vehicle.' 4 9
Although ultimately decided on grounds of trespass, a shadow majority
expressed strong concern about the implications of long-term surveillance.
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Kagan,

(right to object) and article. 6 (accurate data)) with Greenwald & McAskill, supra note
1.
146. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435
(1976).
147. See, e.g., Recitation No. 47, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 36.
148. See Google Spain v. Agencia Espaiola de Protecci6n de Datos, Case C-131/12,
(2014), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document print.jsf?doclang=
EN&text&pagelndex=O&part=1&mode=DOC&docid=1 52065&occ=first&dir&cid=43
7838.
149. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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suggested that in most criminal investigations, long-term monitoring
"impinges on expectations of privacy."150 The nature of new technologies
mattered:
Recent years have seen the emergence of many new devices that permit
the monitoring of a person's movements. In some locales, closed-circuit
television video monitoring is becoming ubiquitous. On toll roads,
automatic toll collection systems create a precise record of the movements
of motorists who choose to make use of their convenience. Many motorists
purchase cars that are equipped with devices that permit a central station to
ascertain the car's location at any time so that roadside assistance may be
provided if needed and the car may be found if it is stolen.'
Justice Sotomayor went one step further, calling into question the entire
basis for the third party doctrine. Specifically, in light of the level of
intrusiveness represented by modem technology, "it may be necessary to
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties."'1 52 Sotomayor
pointed out:
This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a
great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of
carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone numbers that they
dial or text to the cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail
addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service providers;
and the books, groceries, and medications they purchase to online
retailers.'

53

She continued, "I would not assume that all information voluntarily
disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that
reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection."' 54
Congress has an opportunity to take the lead by recognizing the right to
privacy still held by data holders when information is collected by third
parties. It can then craft statutes accordingly, ensuring that U.S. companies
offer greater protections for consumers, in the process allowing industry to
offset the claims of its overseas competitors.
2. Legal Framework

Thus far, U.S. high technology companies have been subject to a very
different statutory and regulatory structure than that which prevails in the

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
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EU. In the United States, privacy rights have largely been protected via a
series of vertical statutes dealing with specific areas, such as children using
the Internet, driver-related information, and medical data."'
In the EU, in contrast, privacy has been protected by a more omnibustype approach, which horizontally reaches across a number of areas. This
approach is reflected in the 1995 Directive as well as the national
legislation implementing the directive on a country-by-country basis.' 56
The vertical statutory scheme has been successful in addressing
particular, discreet areas where privacy interests reside. However, outside
of these narrow exceptions, in the interests of encouraging innovation, the
high technology sector has been left largely unregulated by federal statute.
The assumption has been that market forces would adjust to protect privacy
interests.
The advantage of this approach has been to give high tech companies a
significant amount of flexibility, allowing them to independently gauge the
appropriate level of privacy protections to give to consumers.
The drawback has been that privacy itself has become commoditized,
with companies actually making money off of selling consumers' privacy
interests. Consider Google and its email service, Gmail, for instance. The
company reads and analyzes all of its customers' emails, it watches what
people read, it looks at web sites people visit, and it records what people
purchase. The company then sells access to customers' private lives to

155. Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), Pub. L. 105-277,
112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2012)); Driver's Privacy
Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2099 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2721-2725 (2012)); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,
Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 1320d et seq.
(2012) & 29 U.S.C. § 1181 etseq (2012)).
156. See, e.g., Data Protection Act of 1998, c. 29 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/29/contents;
Bundesdatenchutzgesetz
[BDSG] [Federal Data Protection Act], May 18, 2001, BGBL, I at 904 (Ger.), available
at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/BDSG.htm; Loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978
relative A l'informatique aux fichiers et aux libertis [Law 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978
Relating to Data Files and Liberties]. JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE
[JO.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 7, 1978, p. 227 (revised in 2004), available
at http://www,cnil.fr/documentation/textes-fondateurs/loi78-17/;,
Act
on
the
Amendment of the Personal Data Act (986/2000) (Fin.), available at
http://www.finlex.fi/pdf/saadkaan/; Act on Processing of Personal Data, Act No. 429,
May 2000 (Den.), available at http://www.datatilsynet.dk/english/the-act-onprocessing-of-personal-data/read-the-act-on-processing-of-personal-data/compi ledversion-of-the-act-on-processing-of-personal-data/; Nomos (1997:2472) Prostasia ton
Fysikon Prosopon Enanti tis Epexergasias Dedomenon Prosopikou Charaktira
[Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data], Ephemeris
tes Kyverneseos tes Hellenikes Demokratias [E.K.E.D.] 1997 (Greece), available at
http://www.freedominfo.org/regions/europe/greece/.
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companies who want to advertise.' 5 ' Thus, the mother who sends an email
to her son raising concern about depression may receive an ad within hours
for psychiatric services, even as a pregnant woman merely looking at cribs,
may within days receive mail through the U.S. post, advertising sales at
Babies R'Us.
In September 2013, Google lost an effort in the 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals for judicial review of a lower court's refusal to dismiss multiple
class action lawsuits accusing Google of violating the Wiretap Act.'
United States District Judge Lucy Koh determined that the case was too far
Koh's interpretation of the Electronic
along to suffer delays. 159
Communications Privacy Act limits the "ordinary course of business"
exception-not least because Google's practice violates its own policies.160
The lawsuits, filed in California, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, and
Pennsylvania, at great expense, are ongoing.
Capitalizing on private data represents a significant breach of the right to
privacy. Instead of protecting privacy, the market has exploited it for
monetary gain. In the United States and overseas, individuals are
concerned about the lack of protections afforded. Congressional legislation
could fix this problem by bringing high technology within the broader
statutory framework and thus closing a gap in the existing law.
3. Safe Harbor Considerations
In the wake of the Snowden revelations, the EU Commission issued a
report recommending the retention of Safe Harbor, but recommending
significant changes, including required disclosure of cloud computing and
other service provider contracts used by Safe Harbor members.161
The Safe Harbor provisions, developed from 1999 to 2000 by the U.S.
Commerce Department, the Article 31 Committee on Data Privacy, and the
European Union, created a narrow bridge between the United States and
EU. At the time, the European Parliament, which did not bind the
European Commission, rejected the Safe Harbor provisions by a vote of
279 to 259, with twenty-two abstentions. Chief amongst European

157. Dan Gillmor, As We Sweat Government Surveillance, Companies Like Google
Collect Our Data, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2014/apr/1 8/corporations-google-should-not-sell-customer-data.
158. Joffe v. Google, Inc., 746 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2013).
159. In re Google Inc., No. 5:13-md-02430, 2013 WL 5423918 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26,
2013).
160. Id.
161. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council, EUROPEAN COMM'N (Nov. 27, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/dataprotection/files/com_2013_847 en.pdf.
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concerns was the failure of the agreement to provide adequate protections.
In light of the massive data breaches over the past five years in the
United States, the practices of a largely unregulated high technology
industry, and the ubiquitous nature of NSA surveillance, Europeans are
now even less supportive of the Safe Harbor provisions.' 62 They amount to
a self-regulated scheme in which the U.S. Federal Trade Commission looks
at whether a company, which has voluntarily opted-in to the program, fails
to do what it has stated it will do, within the bounds of its own privacy
policy.1 6 3 Stronger measures are necessary to restore European confidence
in U.S. high technology companies.
C. EstablishingEconomic Security as NationalSecurity
Economic strength as national security, as was previously discussed, is
not a new concept. The Founding itself was premised, in part, on the
importance of economic security as being vital to U.S. national interests.
In 1787, the Articles of Confederation were written out of existence in part
because of concern about building a stronger economy to allow the
government to fulfill its domestic obligations, and to reassure the
international community that the United States was a viable trading
partner.1 64 Since that time, the United States has at times had to remind
itself of the importance of the economy to U.S. national interests. We are
once again at such a moment.
High technology is a vital part of the U.S. economy. It is a symbolic and
actual manifestation of the country's commitment to innovation in every
sphere of life. It plays to the United States' strengths as a nation. It has the
potential to change regimes, to alter political relationships, and to shape the
daily lives of people around the globe. And it deserves special attention.
The danger is that U.S. industry will become less competitive and that the
U.S. will lose its dominance in the Internet sphere.
To some extent, we do, structurally, pay some attention to the
But many
importance of the economy for U.S. national security.
the
possible
of
consequential decisions are not aired in full light
5
One way Congress could
implications for U.S. economic interests.16
162. See European Parliament Resolution supra note 39 ("Takes the view that, as
under the current circumstances the Safe Harbour principles do not provide adequate
protection for EU citizens").
163. See Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE (July 21, 2000),
available at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/egmain_018475.asp.
164. See FEDERALIST No. 11 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The speculative trader will at
once perceive the force of these observations, and will acknowledge that the aggregate
balance of the commerce of the United States would bid fair to be much more favorable
than that of the thirteen States without union or with partial unions.").
165. See In re Google Inc., No. 5:13-md-02430, 2013 WL 5423918 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
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rectify this would be to take a look at how to integrate economic concerns,
as an institutional matter, into the national security infrastructure-and not
just at the highest levels, but at a programmatic level, where key decisions
about programs are being made.
CONCLUSION

The Snowden documents revealed not just the extent to which high
technology companies had been coopted or compromised, but also that the
targets of NSA surveillance include allied and non-allied countries.1 6 6 The
impact of this information has meant that U.S. companies have lost
revenues and experienced declining market share. Simultaneously, the
United States' position in international trade negotiations has been
weakened. Public awareness of the NSA programs spurred international
efforts to implement data localization. Jurisdictional questions and national
borders previously marked the worldwide Internet discussions. 167 But
countries began using the NSA programs to justify restricting data storage
to national borders, making it more difficult for the United States to gain
access. 168 The backlash has led some commentators to raise concern that
"the Internet will never be the same." 6 9 At risk is the balkanization of the
Internet, undermining its traditional culture of open access, and increasing
the cost of doing business.1 70
By undermining high technology companies, U.S. economic securitywhich is central to U.S. national security-is at risk. Part of the problem

26, 2013).
166. See, e.g., Laura Poitras, et al., NSA Spied on European Union Offices, DER
SPIEGEL, (June 29, 2013, 11:21 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/internationalleurope/nsa-
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'Apalachee': How America Spies on Europe and the UN, DER SPEIGEL (Aug. 26, 2013,
11:58 AM), http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/world/secret-nsa-documents-showhow-the-us-spies-on-europe-and-the-un-a-918625.html; Lana Lam & Stephen Chen,
EXCUSIVE: US spies on Chinese Mobile Phone Companies, Steals SMS Data: Edward
Snowden, S. CHINA MORNING POST (June 23, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/
news/china/article/126682 1/us-hacks-chinese-mobile-phone-companies-steals-smsdata-edward-snowden; Lana Lam, US Hacked Pacnet, Asia Pacific Fibre-Optic
Network Operator, in 2009, S. CHINA MORNING POST (June 23, 2013),
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1 266875/exclusive-us-hacked-pacnetasia-pacific-fibre-optic-network-operator; Ewen MacAskill & Julian Borger, New NSA
Leaks Show How U.S. is Bugging its European Allies, THE GUARDIAN (July 1, 2013,
AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/30/nsa-leaks-us-bugging6:28
european-allies.
167. See, e.g., Kristina Irion, Government Cloud Computing and National Data
Sovereignty, 4 Pot'Y & INTERNET 40 (2012).
168. Levy, supra note 10.
169. Levy, supra note 10.
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appears to be that the national security institutional structure has failed to
adequately reflect the importance of economic concerns. Beyond this,
there have been a number of unintended consequences even within spheres
traditionally understood as within a national security realm.
To redress the negative effects that have followed from public awareness
of the NSA programs conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT
Act and Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, the most important step
that Congress could take would be to reign in the surveillance authorities
themselves, in the process providing greater transparency and oversight.
An alteration in U.S. privacy law would also help to reassure U.S.
customers and individuals located outside domestic bounds that consumer
privacy is protected, allowing industry accurately to claim that the
circumstances have changed. Consideration of how to integrate economic
concerns into the national security infrastructure would further help to
emphasize the importance of taking account of the impact of new initiatives
on the United States.

